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Abstract: Incomplete preference relations and self-confident preference relations have 
been widely used in multicriteria decision-making problems. However, there is no strong 
evidence, in the current literature, to validate their use in decision-making. This paper reports 
on the design of two bounded rationality principle based simulation methods, and detailed 
experimental results, that aim at providing evidence to answer the following two questions: (1) 
what are the conditions under which incomplete preference relations are better than complete 
preference relations?; and (2) can self-confident preference relations improve the quality of 
decisions? The experimental results show that when the decision-maker is of medium rational 
degree, incomplete preference relations with a degree of incompleteness between 20% and 
40% outperform complete preference relations; otherwise, the opposite happens. Furthermore, 
in most cases the quality of the decision making improves when using self-confident 
preference relations instead of incomplete preference relations. The paper ends with the 
presentation of a sensitivity analysis that contributes to the robustness of the experimental 
conclusions. 
Keywords: Decision processes; Incomplete preference relations; Self-confidence; 
Rational degree; Incomplete degree. 
1. Introduction 
Preference relations are one of the most widely used preference representation structures 
in multicriteria decision-making problems [7, 27, 30]. Various types of preference relations 
have been proposed in the literature, such as additive preference relations (also called fuzzy 
                                                           
Email addresses: ycdong@scu.edu.cn (Y.C. Dong), 2019004@scuec.edu.cn (W.Q. Liu), chiclana@dmu.ac.uk (F. 
Chiclana), kougang@swufe.edu.cn (G. Kou), viedma@decsai.ugr.es (E. Herrera-Viedma)  
2 
 
preference relations) [20, 28, 33, 40, 48], multiplicative preference relations [28, 36, 38], and 
linguistic preference relations [5, 26, 29, 47]. Sometimes, decision-makers have no 
self-confidence on the provided preference information because of time pressure and/or 
limited expertise regarding the problem domain. In these situations, decision-makers may 
provide their preference information in the form of incomplete preference relation, i.e., a 
preference relation with some of its elements missing [1, 22, 23, 32, 43, 46]. 
In order to deal with incomplete preference relations, Carmone [6] conducted an 
interesting Monte Carlo simulation to investigate the effect of reduced sets of pairwise 
comparisons in the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP). Herrera-Viedma et al. [24] proposed 
an additive-consistency based iterative procedure for estimating the missing values in a 
decision-maker’s incomplete fuzzy preference relation using the provided preference values. 
Fedrizzi and Giove [19] proposed a completion method of incomplete preference relations by 
minimizing a measure of global inconsistency, thus obtaining an optimal preference relation 
from the point of view of consistency with respect to the available judgments. Jandováet et al. 
[25] presented an interactive algorithm to compute interval weights for incomplete pairwise 
comparison matrices in large-dimensional problems, which was based on the sequential 
optimal choice of the pairwise comparisons to be performed and the concept of weak 
consistency. Ergu and Kou [18] proposed an induced bias matrix model to estimate the 
missing comparisons in a questionnaire survey while preserving the global consistency. Chen 
et al. [8] developed a procedure to solve the mixed problem of missing values and 
inconsistency with a single connecting path method. Triantaphyllou [42] formulated a linear 
programming formulation to estimate the missing values in incomplete preference relations. 
Büyüközkan and Çifçi [4] extended the quality function deployment methodology by 
introducing a new group decision-making approach that considers the incomplete information 
of decision-makers by means of the fuzzy set theory. 
In an incomplete preference relation, two self-confidence levels can be stated: the 
decision-makers are self-confident when their preference values for the pairwise ( ,  )i jx x  is 
provided; otherwise, the decision-makers lack self-confidence. Recently, in an attempt to 
provide a more general theoretical context, Liu et al. [29] proposed the self-confident 
preference relations to allow decision-makers express multiple self-confidence levels when 
providing their preferences. Meanwhile, using the hesitancy degree of the reciprocal 
intuitionistic fuzzy preference relation, Ureña et al. [44] defined a concept of 
decision-maker’s confidence to propose a new consistency and confidence-induced ordered 
weighted averaging operator in a group/multicriteria decision-making problem. 
Although incomplete preference relations are very useful in decision-making and have 
been investigated intensively, there are still questions that need answering: 
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(1) What are the conditions under which incomplete preference relations are better than 
complete preference relations? 
(2) Can self-confident preference relations improve the quality of decision-making? 
In order to answer these questions, this paper presents a simulation-based investigation 
with the following features: 
(i) According to the bounded rationality principle [31, 37, 39], widely used as a basis to 
describe choice behaviors of decision-makers [3, 12], the approach of Triantaphyllou 
and Mann [41] is generalized to develop three assumptions, Assumptions 1-3 
(Section 3 and Section 5), to generate, in the proposed simulation-based 
investigation, complete preference relations, incomplete preference relations, and 
self-confident preference relations, respectively. 
(ii) Based on Assumptions 1-3, Simulation Method I (Section 4) and Simulation Method 
II (Section 5) report on the design and results of the simulation experiments. The 
results show that incomplete preference relations outperform complete preference 
relations when the incomplete degree of preference relations is between 20% and 
40% and the decision-maker is of medium rational degree. On the other hand, in 
most cases using self-confident preference relations improve the decision quality 
when compared with using incomplete preference relations. 
(iii) Finally, a sensitivity analysis (Section 6) on the key parameters in the simulation 
experiments is included to contribute to the robustness of the experiments’ 
conclusions. 
The mathematical mapping among different types of preference relations has been 
studied in Chen et al. [9], which allows the focus of study in this paper to be placed on 
multiplicative preference relations, and the proposed methods and results to be similarly 
applied to additive preference relations and linguistic preference relations via the 
corresponding transformation functions. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces preliminary 
knowledge needed later for the simulation-based investigation, which is based on the 
assumptions presented in Section 3. Section 4 develops Simulation Method I to compare the 
performance between incomplete preference relations and complete preference relations. 
Section 5 develops Simulation Method II to compare the performance between incomplete 
preference relations and self-confident preference relations. Section 6 reports on the 
sensitivity analysis on the key parameters in the simulation experiments. Finally, concluding 
remarks are drawn in Section 7. 
2. Preliminaries 
This section contains preliminary knowledge regarding multiplicative preference 
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relations, logarithmic least squares method, and an iterative method to estimate missing 
values in incomplete multiplicative preference relations that will provide a basis for the 
proposed simulation-based investigation. 
2.1 Multiplicative Preference Relations and Logarithmic Least Squares Method 
A multiplicative preference relation is defined as below. 
Definition 1 [36]: A matrix ( )ij n nA a =  is called a multiplicative preference relation 
when 1ij jia a =  and 0ija   ,  i j , where ija  indicates a ratio of the preference intensity 
of alternative ix  to that of alternative jx . 
In multiplicative preference relations, Saaty’s scale of 17 numerical values is used: 
1
,  1,  ,     2,  3,  ...,  9.i i
i
 
= 
 
                          (1) 
The logarithmic least squares method (LLSM) is most commonly used to derive a 
priority vector from multiplicative preference relations [13]. Let 1 2( ,  ,  ...,  )
T
nw w w w=  be the 
priority vector of multiplicative preference relation ( )ij n nA a = , where 0 ( 1,  2,  ...,  )iw i n =  
and 
1
1
n
ii
w
=
= . The priority vector characterizes a consistent multiplicative preference 
relation [36], i.e. matrix ( )ij n nA a =  verifies ,  ,  ,  ij ik kja a a i j k=   , when 
/ ,    ,  1,  2,  ...,  .ij i ja w w i j n= =                         (2) 
When a multiplicative preference relation is not consistent, the expression 
/ ,     ,  1,  2,  ...,  ij ij j ie a w w i j n=  = ,                     (3) 
measures the error between the preference value ija  and the corresponding consistent 
preference value built with priority vector w  as per Eq. (2) [13, 36], which can be 
equivalently written as  
                  log    ije =  log ija -  log iw +  log ,jw  ,  1,  2,  ...,  .i j n=               
(4) 
Thus, the priority vector 1 2( ,  ,  ...,  )
T
nw w w w=  can be obtained by solving the following 
logarithmic least squares model [13]: 
                        
2
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. .
0 ,   1,  ...,  .  
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ij
i j
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ii
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w i n
= =
=
 =

 =


                            (5) 
Crawford and Williams [13] showed that the optimal solution to the above model can be 
expressed as the row geometric mean of ( )ij n nA a = : 
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 
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2.2 Incomplete Multiplicative Preference Relations and an Iterative Method to Estimate 
Missing Values 
A complete preference relation requires a decision-maker to provide ( 1) / 2n n −  
preference values. In real decision-making problems, decision-makers may provide their 
preference information in the form of incomplete preference relation, i.e., with some of its 
elements missing. In the following, we give the definition of incomplete multiplicative 
preference relations. 
Definition 2: A matrix ( )ij n nA a =  is called an incomplete multiplicative preference 
relation, if some of its elements are missing and the provided elements satisfy 1ij jia a =  and 
0ija   ,  i j . 
Similarly to the method developed by Herrera-Viedma et al. [24] for estimating missing 
values in an incomplete additive preference relation, the missing values of an incomplete 
multiplicative preference relation can be estimated as follows. 
I. The following sets are defined: 
  ( ,  )  ,  1,  ,  V i j i j n i j=     
 ( ,  )   is unknown ijMV i j V a=   
\EV V MV=  
 1 ,   ( ,  ),  ( ,  )ikH j i k i j j k EV=    
 2 ,   ( ,  ),  ( ,  )ikH j i k j i j k EV=    
 3 ,   ( ,  ),  ( ,  )ikH j i k i j k j EV=   ,                     (7) 
where MV is the set of incomparable pairs of alternatives; EV is the set of pairs of 
alternatives for which the decision-maker provides preference values; 1ikH , 
2
ikH , and 
3
ikH  
are the sets of intermediate alternatives  ( ,  )jx j i k  that can be used to estimate the 
preference value  ( )ika i k  using 
1j
ik ij jkca a a=  , 
2 /jik jk jica a a= , and 
3 /jik ij kjca a a= , 
respectively. 
II. The subset of missing values MV that can be estimated in step h  is denoted by 
hEMV  and defined as follows, 
 
1
1 2 3
0
( ,  ) \   
h
h h h
h l ik ik ik
l
EMV i k MV EMV i k j H H H
−
=
 
=       
 
,        (8) 
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with 
1
1
0
1
2
0
1
3
0
| ( ,  ),  ( ,  )
| ( ,  ),  ( ,  )
| ( ,  ),  ( ,  )
h
h
ik l
l
h
h
ik l
l
h
h
ik l
l
H j i j j k EV EMV
H j j i j k EV EMV
H j i j k j EV EMV
−
=
−
=
−
=
  
=   
  
  
=   
  
  
=   
  
                    (9) 
with 0EMV =  (by definition). The iterative procedure will stop when maxIterEMV =  with 
maxIter 0 . Moreover, if 
maxIter
0 ll
EMV MV
=
= , then all missing values are estimated, and 
consequently, the procedure is said to be successful in completing the incomplete 
multiplicative preference relation. The complete iterative estimation procedure is described in 
Algorithm 1. 
Algorithm 1. Iterative estimation procedure. 
Input: Incomplete multiplicative preference relation A . 
Output: Complete preference relation CA . 
Step 1: The set 0EMV =  and 1h =  
Step 2: While hEMV   
            1h h= + ; 
            For every ( ,  ) hi k EMV , calculate 
1 2 3 (1/ )( )ik ik ik ikca ca ca ca
=   , where 
(a) If 
1# 0hikH = , let 
1 0ikca = ; else if 
1# 0hikH  , calculate 
1
1
(1/# )1 1( )
h
ik
h
ik
Hj
ik ikj H
ca ca

=  ; 
(b) If 
2# 0hikH = , let 
2 0ikca = ; else if 
2# 0hikH  , calculate 
2
2
(1/# )2 2( )
h
ik
h
ik
Hj
ik ikj H
ca ca

=  ; 
(c) If 
3# 0hikH = , let 
3 0ikca = ; else if 
3# 0hikH  , calculate 
3
3
(1/# )3 3( )
h
ik
h
ik
Hj
ik ikj H
ca ca

=  . 
Let ik ika ca= . 
  End while 
Step 3: If 1/ 9ika   or 9ika  , the median function is applied to normalize the expression domains 
1
( ) med  ( ,  ,  9)
9
ik ikf a a= . 
Step 4: Let CA A= . Output CA . 
 
A sufficient condition for Algorithm 1 to estimate all missing values is given in the 
following result: 
Proposition 1 [49]: The incomplete multiplicative preference relation can be completed 
by the Algorithm 1 iterative method if a set of 1n −  of its non-leading diagonal preference 
values, where each alternative is compared at least once, is known. 
The derivation of the priority vector of an incomplete multiplicative preference relation 
requires first the application of Algorithm 1 for its completion followed by the application of 
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the LLSM method. 
Note. There are two different methods to estimate the missing values of an incomplete 
preference relation: iterative methods [23], and optimization methods [19, 42]. Because both 
the iterative and optimization methods are based on the use of consistency criteria, in many 
cases the corresponding outputs of the two methods are similar [10, 43]. Without loss of 
generality, in this paper the iterative method is used to estimate the missing values of 
incomplete multiplicative preference relations. 
3. Assumptions of the Simulation Experiments 
This section sets out the assumptions of the proposed simulation-based investigation. 
3.1 Approximated Preference Relation of a Priority Vector 
Let 1 2( ,  ,  ...,  )
T
nw w w w= be a true priority vector of the set of alternatives 
 1 2,  ,  ...,  nX x x x=  and ( ) iij n n
j n n
w
W w
w

 
= =   
 
 be the characteristic matrix associated with it. 
Although the ijw  values in ( ) iij n n
j n n
w
W w
w

 
= =   
 
belong to a continuous domain of real numbers, 
it is noted above that decision-makers can only provide a preference relation based on a 
discrete scale of values (Saaty’s scale). Thus, before presenting the proposed 
simulation-based investigation, Question 1 below is discussed. 
Question 1: For a true priority vector 1 2( ,  ,  ...,  )
T
nw w w w=  of the set of alternatives 
 1 2,  ,  ...,  nX x x x= , how will rational decision-makers express their preference relation to 
approximate the true priority vector w ? 
Triantaphyllou and Mann [41] proposed an elegant, concise and interesting method by 
assuming that the decision-maker is always able to choose the closest value from Saaty’s 
scale to ( ) iij n n
j n n
w
W w
w

 
= =   
 
. Specifically, for i j , when 1ijw  , the decision-maker chooses 
the value from  1,  2,  ...,  9  closest  to ijw ; while for 1ijw  , its closest value from the 
reciprocal set of values to  1,  2,  ...,  9
 
is chosen. However, in real life it is difficult for 
decision-makers to choose the closest value to approximate ijw  in all cases. Decision-makers 
are prone to errors and biases according to the bounded rationality principle [12, 31, 37, 39],  
thus the method of Triantaphyllou and Mann [41] needs to be generalized or extended to 
cover these situations. Let  (1) (2) (9),  ,  ...,  w w w    be a permutation of  1,  2,  ...,  9 , where 
( )gw  is the g-th closest value of ijw . It is assumed that gp  is the probability of choosing 
( )gw  to approximate ijw , and then we can get a probability vector ( )1 2 9,  ,  ..., P p p p= . 
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According to the bounded rationality principle, the probability vector should satisfy 0ip  , 
1i ip p +  and 
9
1
1ii p= = . Here, we formally propose the following Assumption 1 that will 
be used in the proposed simulation-based investigation. 
Assumption 1: Let 
1 2( ,  ,  ...,  )
T
nw w w w=  be a true priority vector. For ,i j  when 
1,ijw   a rational decision-maker will express the preference value ( )gw  with the 
probability  ( 1,  2,  ...,  9)gp g =  to approximate ijw . This is symbolized by 
 (1) ( 2 ) ( 9 )1 2 9,  ,  ...,  
w w w
p p p
   , where 0ip  , 1i ip p +  and 
9
1
1ii p= = ; when 1ijw  , the 
reciprocal property is used. 
Clearly, the method of Triantaphyllou and Mann is obtained by setting 
( ) ( )1 2 9,  ,  ..., = 1, 0, 0, ..., 0P p p p= . 
Example 1: Let (0.23, 0.50, 0.10, 0.17)Tw =  
be a true priority vector with characteristic 
matrix 
( )
4 4
4 4
1.000 0.460 2.300 1.353
2.174 1.000 5.000 2.941
0.435 0.200 1.000 0.588
0.739 0.340 1.700 1.000
i
ij
j
w
W w
w

 
  
 = = =     
 
 
. 
If (1,  0,  0,  0,  0,  0,  0,  0,  0)P = , Assumption 1 reduces to the method of Triantaphyllou 
and Mann [41], and produces the following approximated multiplicative preference relation 
1 0.5 2 1
2 1 5 3
0.5 0.2 1 0.5
1 0.33 2 1
W
 
 
 =
 
 
 
. 
If (0.9,  0.1,  0,  0,  0,  0,  0,  0,  0)P = , then the decision-maker will express the preference 
value (1)w  with probability 0.9  and the preference value (2)w  with probability 0.1  to 
approximate ijw . In this case, the approximated preference value ijw  will be 
 (1) ( 2 )0.9 0.1,  w w   for the values 1ijw  , 
   
     
 
32 1 2
0.9 0.1 0.9 0.1
4,63 5 32 2
0.9 0.1 0.9 0.1 0.9 0.1
2 1
0.9 0.1
1 , ,
, 1 , ,
1
, 1
W
− 
 
 =
 − − −
  − − 
. 
Obviously, different probability vectors can be used to reflect different rational degrees 
9 
 
of decision-makers. In this paper we define the rational degree index as follows: 
Definition 3: Let ( )1 2 9,  ,  ..., P p p p=  be a probability vector used in Assumption 1. The  
rational degree index (RDI) of P  is 
                       RDI ( )P =
9
1
i
i
i p
=
 .                            (10) 
The smaller the value of RDI ( )P , the better the rational degree of P . For example, let 
1 (1,  0,  0,  0,  0,  0,  0,  0,  0)P = , 2 (0.9,  0.1,  0,  0,  0,  0,  0,  0,  0)P = , and 3 (0.8,  0.1,  0.1,  0,  0,  0,  0,  0,  0)P =   
be three probability vectors. Based on Eq. (10), we have 1RDI ( )=1P , 2RDI ( )=1.1P , and 
3RDI ( )=1.3P . Thus, the rational degree index of 1P  is better than that of 2P , which is better 
than that of 
3P . 
3.2 Formation of an Incomplete Preference Relation 
Let ( )C Cij n nA a =  be a complete preference relation randomly generated over the set of 
alternatives  1 2,  ,  ...,  nX x x x= . Before constructing incomplete preference relations in the 
proposed simulation-based investigation, Question 2 below is discussed. 
Question 2: Let ( )C Cij n nA a =  be a complete preference relation. How will a rational 
decision-makers express their incomplete preference relation with k missing pairwise 
comparison values to approximate ( )C Cij n nA a = ? 
Let 1 2( ,  ,  ...,  )
C C C C T
nw w w w=  be the priority vector derived from ( )C Cij n nA a =  by LLSM 
[13], and let ( )C Cij n n  =  be the error matrix associated with ( )
C C
ij n n
A a

= , where 
( )
2
log log logC C C Cij ij i ja w w = − +  measures the error degree of preference value 
C
ija . The larger 
the value C
ij , the larger the error degree of preference value 
C
ija . It is natural that a rational 
decision-maker will delete the k preference values with largest error degrees to approximate 
( )C Cij n nA a = . Thus, we formally propose the following Assumption 2 that will be used in the 
proposed simulation-based investigation. 
Assumption 2: Let ( )C Cij n nA a =  be a complete preference relation. When a rational 
decision-maker expresses the incomplete preference relation ,I kA  with k pairwise 
comparison missing values, the k preference values with largest error degrees will be deleted  
in ( )C Cij n nA a = . 
Example 2: Let 
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1 0.5 2 1
2 1 5 3
0.5 0.2 1 0.5
1 0.33 2 1
CA
 
 
 =
 
 
 
 
be a complete preference relation and (0.212,  0.496,  0.100,  0.192)TCw =  its priority vector 
obtained by LLSM. Then its associated error matrix is  
0 0.0046 0.0006 0.0019
0.0046 0 0 0.0042
0.0006 0 0 0.0003
0.0019 0.0042 0.0003 0
C
 
 
 =
 
 
 
. 
Applying Assumption 2 with k =1, 2 and 3 results in the following incomplete preference 
relations, respectively. 
,1
1 2 1
1 5 3
0.5 0.2 1 0.5
1 0.33 2 1
IA
− 
 
−
 =
 
 
 
, ,2
1 2 1
1 5
0.5 0.2 1 0.5
1 2 1
IA
− 
 
− −
 =
 
 
− 
, and ,3
1 2
1 5
0.5 0.2 1 0.5
2 1
IA
− − 
 
− −
 =
 
 
− − 
. 
4. Simulation Experiments: Incomplete vs. Complete 
In this section, Simulation Method I is proposed to compare the use of incomplete 
preference relations and complete preference relations in decision making in terms of 
accuracy performance measure based on the Manhattan distance function. Afterwards, the 
experimental results obtained with Simulation Method I are presented and analyzed. 
4.1 Simulation Method I 
Let 1 2( ,  ,  ...,  )
T
nw w w w=  be the true priority vector of the set of alternatives 
 1 2,  ,  ...,  nX x x x= ; ( )ij n nW w =  its the characteristic matrix;  (1) (2) (9),  ,  ...,  w w w    a 
permutation of  1,  2,  ...,  9 , where ( )gw  is the g-th closest value of  ( )ijw i j ; and 
( )1 2 9,  ,  ..., P p p p=  a probability vector, such that 0ip  , 1i ip p +  and 
9
1
1ii p= = . 
Using Assumption 1, a decision-maker will approximate ijw  with the preference value 
( )gw  with probability  ( 1,  2,  ...,  9)gp g = . In this way, a complete preference relation 
( )C Cij n nA a =  can be randomly generated with the preference value 
C
ija  being ( )gw  with 
probability  ( 1,  2,  ...,  9)gp g = . Let 
Cw  be the priority vector of ( )C Cij n nA a =  obtained by 
LLSM.  
Saaty [35] presented an approach to calculate the deviation between the true priority 
vector w  and the derived priority vector 
Cw . Inspired by Saaty’s work, herein the following 
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Manhattan distance function is considered to measure how well the priority vector 
 
derived 
from the complete preference relation  is able to approximate the true priority vector  
                        
1
DCT  Ci i
n
i
w w
=
−= .                           (11) 
The smaller the DCT value is, the better the performance of the complete preference relation 
CA . 
Based on Assumption 2, when a rational decision-maker expresses the incomplete 
preference relation ,I kA  with k pairwise comparison missing values, the largest k preference 
values with largest associated error degrees will be deleted from ( )C Cij n nA a = . Using this 
method we can generate the incomplete preference relation ,I kA . If ,I kA  satisfies 
Proposition 1, then we can estimate all missing values by the provided Algorithm 1. Then, we 
can derive the priority vector 
,I kw  from ,I kA  by LLSM after completion. The following 
Manhattan distance function is considered to measure how well the priority vector 
 
generated by the incomplete preference relation  approximates the true priority vector : 
                        
,
1
DIT  
n
I k
i i
i
w w
=
= − .                           (12) 
The smaller the DIT  value is, the better the performance of incomplete preference relation 
,I kA . 
Simulation Method I is proposed to compare the respective performance value of 
complete preference relations and incomplete preference relations as measured by Based on  
and , respectively. The Simulation I algorithm is based on the following: first a true priority 
vector w  is randomly generated, followed by the derivation of its characteristic matrix W . 
Then, based on Assumption 1, a complete preference relation CA  is randomly generated and 
its priority vector Cw  computed. Based on Assumption 2, the incomplete preference relation 
,I kA  is generated and its priority vector ,I kw  computed. Finally, DCT  and DIT  are 
derived and used to find out when incomplete preference relations outperform complete 
preference relations. Next, we describe Simulation Method I in its algorithmic form. 
Simulation I Algorithm. Simulation Method I to compare performance values of incomplete 
preference relations and complete preference relations. 
Input: The dimension of the preference relation n, the probability vector P, the number of pairwise 
comparison missing values k. 
Output: R  and S . 
Step 1: Generate true priority vector 1 2( ,  ,  ...,  )
T
nw w w w= , where the values iw ( 1,  2,  ...,  )i n=  are 
uniformly randomly selected from [0, 1]. Then, normalize w  so that 
1
1
n
i
i
w
=
= . Let 
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( ) iij n n
j n n
w
W w
w

 
= =  
 
 
 be the characteristic matrix associated with the true priority vector w . 
Step 2: Let  , (1) , (2) , (9),  ,  ...,  ij ij ijw w w    be a permutation of  1,  2,  ...,  9 , where , ( )ij gw   is the g-th 
closest value of ijw . Based on Assumption 1, randomly generate a complete preference 
relation ( )C Cij n nA a = , where the preference value 
C
ija  is , ( )ij gw   with probability 
 ( 1,  2,  ...,  9)gp g = . Let 
Cw  be the priority vector of CA  obtained by LLSM. 
Step 3: Based on Assumption 2, delete the k preference values with largest associated error degrees in 
CA  to generate the incomplete preference relations ,I kA . If ,I kA  satisfies Proposition 1, then 
estimate all missing values using Algorithm 1. Let ,I kw  be the priority vector of ,I kA  
obtained by LLSM after completion. If ,I kA  does not satisfy Proposition 1, go to Step 1. 
Step 4: Calculate 
1
DCT Ci i
n
i
w w
=
−=  and 
,
1
DIT
n
I k
i i
i
w w
=
= − . Let 
DCT
DIT
R = . If DIT DCT , let 1S = . 
Otherwise, let 0S = . Output R  and S . 
 
In Simulation Method I, the difference between 
,I kw  and w  is smaller than the 
difference between 
Cw  and w  when 1R   or 1S = , which means that the priority vector 
,I kw  approximates the true priority vector w  better than the priority vector 
Cw . Meanwhile, 
the priority vector 
Cw  approximates the true priority vector w  better than the priority 
vector 
,I kw  when 1R   or 0S = . 
    Remark 1. In Step 3 of Simulation Method I, if the incomplete preference relation ,I kA  
satisfies Proposition 1, the ,I kA  can be completed by the given iterative estimation procedure 
(Algorithm 1) and the Simulation algorithm I will continue. Otherwise, it is impossible to 
derive a priority vector from ,I kA , and thus a new incomplete preference relation is to be 
created in a new round. Based on Proposition 1, it is required to set 
( 1)
( 1)
2
n n
k n
− 
 − − 
 
 
when using Simulation Method I. 
4.2 Experimental Results: Incomplete vs. Complete 
The experiment settings based on Simulation Method I are as follows. 
(1) Eight (8) probability vectors are used to reflect different rational degree of 
decision-makers. Based on Definition 3, the RDI from 1P  to 8P  is gradually decreased. 
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1
2
3
4
5
6
7
(1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0)
(0.9,0.1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0)
(0.8,0.1,0.1,0,0,0,0,0,0)
(0.7,0.1,0.1,0.1,0,0,0,0,0)
(0.6,0.1,0.1,0.1,0.1,0,0,0,0)
(0.5,0.1,0.1,0.1,0.1,0.1,0,0,0)
(0.4,0.1,0.1,0.1,0.1,0.1,
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
8
0.1,0,0)
(0.3,0.1,0.1,0.1,0.1,0.1,0.1,0.1,0)P =
 
                                                                      (13) 
(2) In the simulation, the initial priority values iw  ( 1,  2,  ...,  )i n=  are the exact 
numbers that are randomly selected from [0,  1] . In addition, let 
2
100%
( 1)
k
per
n n

= 
−
 
measure the incompleteness degree in a preference relation with k pairwise comparison 
missing values. For example, when setting the size of preference relations at 5n =  and the 
number of pairwise comparison missing values at 2k = , the incompleteness degree will be 
20%per = .  Since 
( 1)
( 1)
2
n n
k n
− 
 − − 
 
, we have that 
2
100%
n
per
n
−
  . 
Different input parameters n , P  and k  are set, and Simulation Method I is run 1000 
times to obtain the average values of R  and S  under different parameters. The larger the 
average values of R  and S , the better the priority vector 
,I kw  approximates the true 
priority vector w . Meanwhile, the smaller the average values of R  and S , the better the 
priority vector 
Cw  approximates the true priority vector w . When the average 1R   and 
50%S  , the experimental results indicate that incomplete preference relations outperform 
the complete preference relations. On the other hand, when the average 1R   and 50%S   
the complete preference relations outperform the incomplete preference relations. 
The experimental results of average values of R  and S  under different parameters are 
pictured in Figs. 1 and 2, respectively. The following observations can be drawn. 
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Fig.1. Average values of R  under different n , P , and per  values. 
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Fig.2. Average values of S  under different n , P , and per  values. 
 (1) Fig. 1 illustrates how the average values of R  change with respect to the size of 
the preference relation, the rational degree, and the incompleteness degree. From Fig. 1 the 
following two observations are drawn: 
(i) When the rational degree of decision-makers ranges from 3P  to 6P  and the 
incompleteness degree of the preference relation is between 20% and 40%, the 
average values of R  are greater than 1 (the red part in Fig. 1) and therefore the 
incomplete preference relation outperforms the complete preference relation. 
(ii) When the rational degree is high (e.g., 1P  and 2P ) or low (e.g., 7P  and 8P ), and 
the incompleteness degree is greater than 60% or lower than 10%, the average 
values of R  are less than 1 (the non-red part in Fig. 1) and therefore the complete 
preference relations outperforms the incomplete preference relations. 
 (2) Fig. 2 further helps us understand the impact of the rational degree and the 
incompleteness degree of a preference relation on the quality of the priority vectors. When the 
rational degree is ranges from 3P  to 6P  and the incompleteness degree is between 20% to 
40%, the average values of S  are higher than 50%, i.e. the number of times that the 
incomplete preference relation outperforms the complete preference relation  is higher than 
the number of times the opposite. In summary, incomplete preference relations have better 
performance when the incompleteness degree of preference relations is between 20% and 
40%, and the decision-maker is of medium rational degree. 
(3) The above conclusions are more evident for high values of the dimension of 
preference relations. As the dimension of preference relations increases, the area of red in Fig. 
1 increases while the average value of S  increases as per Fig. 2. As a result, when the 
incompleteness degree and the rational degree are both medium, the use of incomplete 
preference relations will further improve the quality of the priority vectors with the increase 
of the dimension of preference relations. 
Although incomplete preference relations have been widely used, Simulation Method I 
provides evidence that indicates their use in all cases not to be the best course of action to 
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achieve the best quality decision. The use of incomplete preference relations in 
decision-making  can be better supported by using the observations drawn above from the 
average values of both R  and S . 
Remark 2. We find that the rational degree and incompleteness degree have an 
important impact on the performance of incomplete preference relations, which means that 
the efficient use of incomplete preference relations depends on the estimation of the rational 
degree of a decision-maker. However, we argue that it is a challenging task to estimate the 
rational degree of a decision-maker in real life. Instead, in the next section we introduce the 
concept of self-confident preference relations, in which the decision-maker is required to 
express multiple self-confidence levels over their pairwise comparison preference values. 
5. Simulation Experiments: Incomplete vs. Self-confident 
In this section, self-confident preference relations are defined. Simulation Method II is 
proposed to compare the performances of incomplete preference relations and self-confident 
preference relations. It will be shown that self-confident preference relations generally 
outperfom incomplete preference relations. 
5.1 Self-confident Preference Relations and Extended Logarithmic Least Squares Method 
Rating scales are widely used in decision-making processes. A rating scale 
{1,  2,  3,  ...,  }N  refers to an N-point scale in which people have N  rating options: “1= 
extremely poor … N= extremely good” [2, 11, 17, 21]. Let  1,  2,  ,  SLS N=  be an N-point 
rating scale used by decision-makers to characterize their self-confidence levels over the 
preference relation values they provide. The higher the value in 
SLS , the higher the 
self-confidence level. Setting different N values results in different rating scales. Inspired by 
Liu et al. [29], we define self-confident preference relations as follows. 
Definition 3: A matrix * * *(( ,  ))ij ij n nA a s =  is called a self-confident preference relation if 
its elements have two components: the first component, *ija , represents the preference degree 
or intensity of the alternative ix  over the alternative jx , and the second component, 
* SL
ijs S , represents the self-confidence level associated with the preference value 
*
ija . The 
following conditions are assumed: * * 1ij jia a = , 
* *
ij jis s= , and 
*
iis N=  for ,  1,  2,  ...,  i j n= . 
In order to derive the priority vector of a self-confident preference relation, the LLSM is 
extended by adding the self-confidence values *
ijs  as coefficients in the model as follows: 
* * * * 2
1 1
min  (log log log )
n n
ij ij i j
i j
s a w w
= =
 − +  
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*
1
*
1 ,
. .
0 ,   1, , .  
n
ii
i
w
s t
w i n
=
 =

 =

.                             (14) 
The self-confidence value *
ijs  in model (14) determines the magnification of error 
degree, with higher values of *
ijs  indicating a higher magnification of error degree. In this 
paper, model (14) is successfully solved using the MATLAB nonlinear optimization function 
“fmincon”. 
As mentioned before, there is always at least two self-confidence levels in an incomplete 
preference relation in a broad sense: the decision-makers have self-confidence when making a 
pairwise comparison between alternatives ix  and jx  when they provides their preference 
values for such pair of alternatives ( ,  )i jx x ; otherwise, preference values are missing because 
the decision-makers completely lack self-confidence. In a self-confident preference relation, 
multiple self-confidence levels may be used according to the rating scale  1,  2,  ,  SLS N= . 
We used Simulation Method II to compare the performances of incomplete preference 
relations and self-confident preference relations. 
5.2 Simulation Method 
Let ( )C Cij n nA a =  be a complete preference relation over the set of alternatives 
 1 2,  ,  ...,  nX x x x= . Before presenting the simulation method for self-confident preference 
relations, the following Question 3 below is discussed. 
Question 3: Given a rating scale  1,  2,  ,  SLS N= , how will rational decision-makers 
express self-confidence levels associated with their preference values C
ija  in a complete 
preference relation ( )C Cij n nA a = ? 
Let ( )C Cij n n  =  be the error matrix associated with ( )
C C
ij n n
A a

= , as previously defined: 
( )
2
log log logC C C Cij ij i ja w w = − + . Let (1) (2) ( 1)
( )
2
,  ,  ...,  C C C n n 

   −
 
 
 
 be a permutation of the upper 
triangular error values  |  1,  2,  ...,  ;  1,  ...,  Cij i n j i n = = + , where ( )C k  is the k-th largest 
value in  |  1,  2,  ...,  ;  1,  ...,  Cij i n j i n = = + . It is assumed that 1E , 2E , …, NE  be subsets of 
 |  1,  2,  ...,  ;  1,  ...,  Cij i n j i n = = + , where 
               kE =  ( 1)( 1)
1
2
,C
n n k
N


− −  
+  
  
 
( 1)( 1)
2
2
C
n n k
N


− −  
+  
  
, …, 
( 1)
2
C
n n k
N


−  
  
  
 .         (15) 
and the function [ ]x  denotes the largest integer which is smaller than x, i.e., the largest 
integer verifying 1 [ ]x x x−   . 
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    It is natural that a rational decision-maker will express a lower self-confident degree 
associated with the preference value C
ija  with a higher error value 
C
ij . Thus, the following 
Assumption 3 is formally proposed for its use in Simulation Method II. 
Assumption 3: Let ( )C Cij n nA a =  be a complete preference relation, and let 
 1,  2,  ,  SLS N=  be a rating scale. If Cij kE   ( 1,  2,  ...,  i n= ; 1,  ...,  j i n= + ; 
1,  2, ...,  k N= ), then a rational decision-maker expresses the self-confidence value 
ijs k=  
associated with the preference value C
ija , and ji ijs s= . 
Example 3: Let 
1 0.5 2 1
2 1 5 3
0.5 0.2 1 0.5
1 0.33 2 1
CA
 
 
 =
 
 
 
 
be a complete preference relation and let 
0 0.0046 0.0006 0.0019
0.0046 0 0 0.0042
0.0006 0 0 0.0003
0.0019 0.0042 0.0003 0
C
 
 
 =
 
 
 
 
be its associated error matrix. 
The permutation, from highest to smallest, of the upper triangular error values will be: 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 12 24 14 13 34 23,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  C C C C C C C C C C C C                = . Setting  1,  2,  3SLS = results 
in  1 12 24,  C CE  = ,  2 14 13,  C CE  =  and  3 34 23,  C CE  = . Based on Assumption 3, it is 
* *
12 24 1s s= = , 
* *
14 13 2s s= = , and 
* *
34 23 3s s= = . Thus, the following self-confident preference relation is 
obtained: ( )( )* * *,  ij ij
n n
A a s

= , where * Cij ija a= , i.e., 
*
(1,  3) (0.5,  1) (2,  2) (1,  2)
(2,  1) (1,  3) (5,  3) (3,  1)
(0.5,  2) (0.2,  3) (1,  3) (0.5,  3)
(1,  2) (0.33,  1) (2,  3) (1,  3)
A
 
 
 =
 
 
 
. 
Let * * * *1 2( ,  ,  ...,  )
T
nw w w w=  be the priority vector of ( )( )* * *,  ij ij
n n
A a s

=  obtained by the 
extended LLSM. The following Manhattan distance function is considered to to evaluate how 
well the priority vector  obtained from the self-confident preference relation  is able to 
approximate the true priority vector : 
                          
1
*DST  i i
n
i
w w
=
−= ,                          (16) 
A small DST value indicates a high performance of the self-confident preference relation *A . 
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Based on the use of DIT and DST (see Eqs. (12) and (16)), Simulation Method II is 
presented to compare incomplete preference relations against self-confident preference 
relations. Simulation II algorithm is based on the following: first a true priority vector w  is 
randomly generated, followed by the derivation of its characteristic matrix W . Then, (1) 
based on Assumption 1, a complete preference relation CA  is randomly generated and its 
error matrix 
C  is derived; (2) based on Assumption 2, the incomplete preference relation 
,I kA  is generated and its priority vector ,I kw  is derived; and (3 based on Assumption 3, a 
self-confident preference relation *A  is generated and its priority vector 
*w  is derived. 
Finally, DIT and DST values are computed to compare the performances of incomplete 
preference relations and self-confident preference relations. Clearly, Simulation Method II is 
similar to Simulation Method I, and it can be formally described in algorithmic form below. 
Simulation II Algorithm. Simulation Method II to compare the performances of incomplete 
preference relations and self-confident preference relations. 
Input: The dimension of the preference relation n, the probability vector P, the number of pairwise 
comparison missing values k, and the rating scale  1,  2,  ,  SLS N= . 
Output: *R  and *S . 
Step 1: Generate a true priority vector 1 2( ,  ,  ...,  )
T
nw w w w= , where the values iw ( 1,  2,  ...,  )i n=  are 
uniformly randomly generated from [0, 1]. Then, normalize w  so that 
1
1
n
i
i
w
=
= . Let 
( ) iij n n
j n n
w
W w
w

 
= =  
 
 
 be the characteristic matrix associated with the true priority vector w . 
Step 2: Let  , (1) , (2) , (9),  ,  ...,  ij ij ijw w w    be a permutation of  1,  2,  ...,  9 , where , (g)ijw   is the g-th 
closest value of ijw . Based on Assumption 1, randomly generate a complete preference 
relation ( )C Cij n nA a = , where the preference value 
C
ija  is , ( )ij gw   with probability 
 ( 1,  2,  ...,  9)gp g = . Let 
Cw  be the priority vector of CA  obtained by LLSM. 
Step 3: Based on Assumption 2, delete the k preference values with largest associated error degrees in 
CA  to generate the incomplete preference relations ,I kA . If ,I kA  satisfies Proposition 1, 
then estimate all missing values using Algorithm 1. Let ,I kw  be the priority vector of ,I kA  
obtained by LLSM after completion. If ,I kA  does not satisfy Proposition 1, go to Step 1. 
Step 4: Based on Assumption 3, generate the self-confidence value ijs  associated with the preference 
value Cija  and obtain the self-confident preference relation 
*A . Let *w  be the priority 
vector of *A  obtained by extended LLSM. 
Step 5: Compute ,
1
DIT
n
I k
i i
i
w w
=
= −  and 
*
1
DST i i
n
i
w w
=
−= . Let *
DIT
DST
R = . If DST DIT , let 
* 1S = . Otherwise, let * 0S = . Output *R  and *S . 
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In Simulation Method II, the difference between 
*w  and w  is lower than the 
difference between 
,I kw  and w  when * 1R   or * 1S = , which means that the priority 
vector 
*w  approximates the true priority vector w  better than the priority vector 
,I kw . 
Meanwhile, the priority vector 
,I kw  approximates the true priority vector w  better than the 
priority vector 
*w  when * 1R   or * 0S = . 
5.3 Experimental Results: Incomplete vs. Self-confident 
The experiment settings based on Simulation Method II are as follows. 
(1) The set {1,  2,  3,  4,  5}SLS =  is used to characterize the self-confidence levels over 
the preference values. 
(2) In the simulation, the initial priority values iw  ( 1,  2,  ...,  )i n=  are the numbers 
randomly generated from [0,  1] . In addition, as in Simulation Method I, we let 
2
100%
( 1)
k
per
n n

= 
−
 because when 
( 1)
( 1)
2
n n
k n
− 
 − − 
 
, 
2
100%
n
per
n
−
  . 
Different input parameters n , P  and k  are set, and Simulation Method II is run 1000 
times to obtain the average values of *R  and *S  under different parameters. The higher the 
average values of *R  and *S , the better the priority vector 
*w  approximates the true 
priority vector w . Meanwhile, the smaller the average values of *R  and 
*S , the better the 
priority vector 
,I kw  approximates the true priority vector w . When * 1R   and 
* 50%S  , 
the self-confident preference relations outperform incomplete preference relations. On the 
other hand, when * 1R   and * 50%S  , the incomplete preference relations outperform 
self-confident preference relations. 
The experimental results obtained for the average values of *R  and *S  under different 
parameters are pictured in Figs. 3 and 4, respectively. The following observations can be 
drawn: 
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Fig. 3. Average values of 
*R  under different n , P , and per  values. 
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Fig. 4. Average values of *S  under different n , P , and per  values. 
 (1) Fig. 3 reveals how the average values of *R  change with respect to the dimension 
of the preference relations, the rational degree, and the incompleteness degree; in most cases, 
the average values of *R  are greater than 1 (the red part in Fig. 3), which means that using 
self-confident preference relations improve the quality of the priority vectors more than using 
incomplete preference relations. Furthermore, a small dimension of preference relations (e.g., 
4,  5n = ) clearly enhances the performance of self-confident preference relations. 
(2) Fig. 4 further helps us understand the impact of the rational degree and the 
incompleteness degree of preference relations on the effect of the average values of *S , 
which in most cases are higher than 50%, meaning that self-confident preference relations 
outperform incomplete preference relations. Furthermore, when the rational degree is high 
(e.g., 1P  and 2P ) or low (e.g., 7P  and 8P ), the advantage of using self-confident 
preference relations is more significant than using incomplete preference relations. 
Remark 3. Complete preference relations and self-confident preference relations were 
also compared, and the obtained results show that in most cases self-confident preference 
relations outperform complete preference relations. This is consistent with the results from 
Simulation Method I reported in Section 4. However, due to space limitations, this 
comparative analysis is not included herein. 
6. Sensitivity Analysis 
In order to make the above conclusions more robust, this section further investigates the 
sensitivity of the key parameters in the simulation methods. 
6.1 Sensitivity of Probability Vectors 
Let 1 2 8,  ,  ...,  P P P  be as before. In order to investigate the sensitivity of probability 
vectors, a random disturbance 
ij  generated from a uniform distribution on  is added to 
( )1 2 9,  ,  ...,  ,  ...,  i i i ij iP p p p p=  ( 1,  2,  ...,  8)i =  (see Eq. (13)), which results in 
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( )1 2 9,  ,  ...,  ,  ...,  i i i ij iP p p p p    =  where 
                             
9
1
( )
ij ij
ij
ij iji
p
p
p


=
+
 =
+
.                         (17) 
Similarly to the simulation experiments in Section 4.2, Simulation Method I is run 1000 
times under different probability vectors (
1 2 8,  ,  ...,  P P P
   ) that are randomly generated by Eq. 
(17), obtaining average values of R  and S  as per Figs. 5 and 6, with similar observations 
as those drawn for Figs. 1 and 2 can be drawn in this case as well. Therefore, it is noticed that 
conclusions previously discussed in Sections 4 and 5 are not affected by the disturbance of the 
probability vector used. 
 
       
Fig. 5. Average values of R  in Simulation Method I under different probability vectors 1 2 8,  ,  ...,  P P P   . 
         
Fig. 6. Average values of S  in Simulation Method I under different probability vectors 1 2 8,  ,  ...,  P P P   . 
6.2 Sensitivity of Rating Scale 
In Simulation Method II, {1,  2, 3, 4, 5}SLS =  was used as the rating scale to characterize 
self-confidence levels over preference values. In order to investigate the sensitivity of the 
rating scale, two alternative rating scales with different granularities, 1 {1,  2, 3}SLS =  and 
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2 {1,  2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7}SLS = , are also used. The Average values of *R  when running Simulation 
Method II 1000 times under 
1SLS  and 
2SLS  are shown in Fig. 7. The average values of 
*S  
when Simulation Method II is run 1000 times under 
1SLS  and 
2SLS  are shown in Fig. 8. 
Again, the same observation drawn from Figs. 3 and 4 can be drawn from Figs. 7 and 8, and 
self-confident preference relations outperform incomplete preference relations. In particular, 
it is found that the performance of self-confident preference relations under the rating scale  
is better than that under the rating scale , and also better than that under the rating scale . This 
observation suggests that a higher granularity of the rating scale enhances the performance of 
self-confident preference relations. 
 
       
       
Fig. 7. Average values of 
*R  in Simulation Method II under 
1SLS  and 2SLS . 
         
25 
 
         
Fig. 8. Average values of 
*S  in Simulation Method II under 1SLS  and 2SLS . 
7. Conclusions 
In this paper, we design two bounded rationality principle based simulation experiments 
to compare the performance of complete preference relations, incomplete preference relations, 
and self-confident preference relations regarding their accuracy in approximating the true 
priority vector. The results from the simulation experiments provide evidence towards 
uncovering answers to the following questions: (1) what are the conditions under which 
incomplete preference relations outperform complete preference relations? (2) Can 
self-confident preference relations improve the quality of decisions? The main findings in this 
research study are: 
(1) The experimental results reveal that incomplete preference relations outperform 
complete preference relations when the incompleteness degree of preference 
relations ranges between 20% and 40%, and the decision-maker is of medium 
rational degree. 
(2) Incomplete preference relations improve the quality of the priority vectors more 
significantly with the increase of their dimension. 
(3) In most cases, self-confident preference relations outperform incomplete preference 
relations. Furthermore, a small dimension of preference relations clearly enhances 
the performance of self-confident preference relations. 
Finally, a sensitivity analysis is also reported adding to the robustness of the above 
findings. In future, we will further compare the performance of complete preference relations, 
incomplete preference relations, and self-confident preference relations in a group 
decision-making context [9, 14, 15, 16, 34, 45]. 
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